Copybara | 854996b | 2021-09-07 19:36:02 +0000 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | # Copyright 2018 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| 2 | # Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style |
| 3 | # license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at |
| 4 | # https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd |
| 5 | |
| 6 | from __future__ import print_function |
| 7 | from __future__ import division |
| 8 | from __future__ import absolute_import |
| 9 | |
| 10 | import cgi |
| 11 | import functools |
| 12 | import logging |
| 13 | import time |
| 14 | import sys |
| 15 | |
| 16 | from google.oauth2 import id_token |
| 17 | from google.auth.transport import requests as google_requests |
| 18 | |
| 19 | from google.appengine.api import oauth |
| 20 | from google.appengine.api import users |
| 21 | from google.appengine.api import app_identity |
| 22 | from google.protobuf import json_format |
| 23 | from components.prpc import codes |
| 24 | from components.prpc import server |
| 25 | |
| 26 | from framework import monitoring |
| 27 | |
| 28 | import settings |
| 29 | from api.v3 import converters |
| 30 | from framework import authdata |
| 31 | from framework import exceptions |
| 32 | from framework import framework_constants |
| 33 | from framework import monitoring |
| 34 | from framework import monorailcontext |
| 35 | from framework import ratelimiter |
| 36 | from framework import permissions |
| 37 | from framework import sql |
| 38 | from framework import xsrf |
| 39 | from services import client_config_svc |
| 40 | from services import features_svc |
| 41 | |
| 42 | |
| 43 | # Header for XSRF token to protect cookie-based auth users. |
| 44 | XSRF_TOKEN_HEADER = 'x-xsrf-token' |
| 45 | # Header for test account email. Only accepted for local dev server. |
| 46 | TEST_ACCOUNT_HEADER = 'x-test-account' |
| 47 | # Optional header to help us understand why certain calls were made. |
| 48 | REASON_HEADER = 'x-reason' |
| 49 | # Optional header to help prevent double updates. |
| 50 | REQUEST_ID_HEADER = 'x-request-id' |
| 51 | # Domain for service account emails. |
| 52 | SERVICE_ACCOUNT_DOMAIN = 'gserviceaccount.com' |
| 53 | |
| 54 | |
| 55 | def ConvertPRPCStatusToHTTPStatus(context): |
| 56 | """pRPC uses internal codes 0..16, but we want to report HTTP codes.""" |
| 57 | return server._PRPC_TO_HTTP_STATUS.get(context._code, 500) |
| 58 | |
| 59 | |
| 60 | def PRPCMethod(func): |
| 61 | @functools.wraps(func) |
| 62 | def wrapper(self, request, prpc_context, cnxn=None): |
| 63 | return self.Run( |
| 64 | func, request, prpc_context, cnxn=cnxn) |
| 65 | |
| 66 | wrapper.wrapped = func |
| 67 | return wrapper |
| 68 | |
| 69 | |
| 70 | class MonorailServicer(object): |
| 71 | """Abstract base class for API servicers. |
| 72 | """ |
| 73 | |
| 74 | def __init__(self, services, make_rate_limiter=True, xsrf_timeout=None): |
| 75 | self.services = services |
| 76 | if make_rate_limiter: |
| 77 | self.rate_limiter = ratelimiter.ApiRateLimiter() |
| 78 | else: |
| 79 | self.rate_limiter = None |
| 80 | # We allow subclasses to specify a different timeout. This allows the |
| 81 | # RefreshToken method to check the token with a longer expiration and |
| 82 | # generate a new one. |
| 83 | self.xsrf_timeout = xsrf_timeout or xsrf.TOKEN_TIMEOUT_SEC |
| 84 | self.converter = None |
| 85 | |
| 86 | def Run( |
| 87 | self, handler, request, prpc_context, |
| 88 | cnxn=None, perms=None, start_time=None, end_time=None): |
| 89 | """Run a Do* method in an API context. |
| 90 | |
| 91 | Args: |
| 92 | handler: API handler method to call with MonorailContext and request. |
| 93 | request: API Request proto object. |
| 94 | prpc_context: pRPC context object with status code. |
| 95 | cnxn: Optional connection to SQL database. |
| 96 | perms: PermissionSet passed in during testing. |
| 97 | start_time: Int timestamp passed in during testing. |
| 98 | end_time: Int timestamp passed in during testing. |
| 99 | |
| 100 | Returns: |
| 101 | The response proto returned from the handler or None if that |
| 102 | method raised an exception that we handle. |
| 103 | |
| 104 | Raises: |
| 105 | Only programming errors should be raised as exceptions. All |
| 106 | exceptions for permission checks and input validation that are |
| 107 | raised in the Do* method are converted into pRPC status codes. |
| 108 | """ |
| 109 | start_time = start_time or time.time() |
| 110 | cnxn = cnxn or sql.MonorailConnection() |
| 111 | if self.services.cache_manager: |
| 112 | self.services.cache_manager.DoDistributedInvalidation(cnxn) |
| 113 | |
| 114 | response = None |
| 115 | requester_auth = None |
| 116 | metadata = dict(prpc_context.invocation_metadata()) |
| 117 | mc = monorailcontext.MonorailContext(self.services, cnxn=cnxn, perms=perms) |
| 118 | try: |
| 119 | self.AssertBaseChecks(request, metadata) |
| 120 | client_id, requester_auth = self.GetAndAssertRequesterAuth( |
| 121 | cnxn, metadata, self.services) |
| 122 | logging.info('request proto is:\n%r\n', request) |
| 123 | logging.info('requester is %r', requester_auth.email) |
| 124 | monitoring.IncrementAPIRequestsCount( |
| 125 | 'v3', client_id, client_email=requester_auth.email) |
| 126 | |
| 127 | # TODO(crbug.com/monorail/8161)We pass in a None client_id for rate |
| 128 | # limiting because CheckStart and CheckEnd will track and limit requests |
| 129 | # per email and client_id separately. |
| 130 | # So if there are many site users one day, we may end up rate limiting our |
| 131 | # own site. With a None client_id we are only rate limiting by emails. |
| 132 | if self.rate_limiter: |
| 133 | self.rate_limiter.CheckStart(None, requester_auth.email, start_time) |
| 134 | mc.auth = requester_auth |
| 135 | if not perms: |
| 136 | # NOTE(crbug/monorail/7614): We rely on servicer methods to call |
| 137 | # to call LookupLoggedInUserPerms() with a project when they need to. |
| 138 | mc.LookupLoggedInUserPerms(None) |
| 139 | |
| 140 | self.converter = converters.Converter(mc, self.services) |
| 141 | response = handler(self, mc, request) |
| 142 | |
| 143 | except Exception as e: |
| 144 | if not self.ProcessException(e, prpc_context, mc): |
| 145 | raise e.__class__, e, sys.exc_info()[2] |
| 146 | finally: |
| 147 | if mc: |
| 148 | mc.CleanUp() |
| 149 | if self.rate_limiter and requester_auth and requester_auth.email: |
| 150 | end_time = end_time or time.time() |
| 151 | self.rate_limiter.CheckEnd( |
| 152 | None, requester_auth.email, end_time, start_time) |
| 153 | self.RecordMonitoringStats(start_time, request, response, prpc_context) |
| 154 | |
| 155 | return response |
| 156 | |
| 157 | def CheckIDToken(self, cnxn, metadata): |
| 158 | # type: (MonorailConnection, Mapping[str, str]) |
| 159 | # -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[authdata.AuthData]] |
| 160 | """Authenticate user from an ID token. |
| 161 | |
| 162 | Args: |
| 163 | cnxn: connection to the SQL database. |
| 164 | metadata: metadata sent by the client. |
| 165 | |
| 166 | Returns: |
| 167 | The audience (AKA client_id) and a new AuthData object representing |
| 168 | the user making the request or (None, None) if no ID token was found. |
| 169 | |
| 170 | Raises: |
| 171 | permissions.PermissionException: If the token is invalid, the client ID |
| 172 | is not allowlisted, or no user email was found in the ID token. |
| 173 | """ |
| 174 | bearer = metadata.get('authorization') |
| 175 | if not bearer: |
| 176 | return None, None |
| 177 | if bearer.lower().startswith('bearer '): |
| 178 | token = bearer[7:] |
| 179 | else: |
| 180 | raise permissions.PermissionException('Invalid authorization token.') |
| 181 | # TODO(crbug.com/monorail/7724): Use cachecontrol module to cache |
| 182 | # certification used for verification. |
| 183 | request = google_requests.Request() |
| 184 | |
| 185 | try: |
| 186 | id_info = id_token.verify_oauth2_token(token, request) |
| 187 | logging.info('ID token info: %r' % id_info) |
| 188 | except ValueError: |
| 189 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 190 | 'Invalid bearer token.') |
| 191 | |
| 192 | audience = id_info['aud'] |
| 193 | email = id_info.get('email') |
| 194 | if not email: |
| 195 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 196 | 'No email found in token info. ' |
| 197 | 'Make sure requests are made with scopes `openid` and `email`') |
| 198 | |
| 199 | auth_client_ids, service_account_emails = ( |
| 200 | client_config_svc.GetClientConfigSvc().GetClientIDEmails()) |
| 201 | |
| 202 | if email.endswith(SERVICE_ACCOUNT_DOMAIN): |
| 203 | # For service accounts, the email must be allowlisted to call the |
| 204 | # API and we must confirm that the ID token was meant for |
| 205 | # Monorail by checking the audience. |
| 206 | |
| 207 | # An API call to any <version>-dot-<service>-dot-<app_id>.appspot.com |
| 208 | # must have token audience of `https://<app_id>.appspot.com` |
| 209 | app_id = app_identity.get_application_id() # e.g. 'monorail-prod' |
| 210 | host = 'https://%s.appspot.com' % app_id |
| 211 | if audience != host: |
| 212 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 213 | 'Invalid token audience: %s.' % audience) |
| 214 | if email not in service_account_emails: |
| 215 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 216 | 'Account %s is not allowlisted' % email) |
| 217 | else: |
| 218 | # For users, the audience is the client_id of the site used to make |
| 219 | # the call to Monorail's API. The client_id must be allow-listed. |
| 220 | if audience not in auth_client_ids: |
| 221 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 222 | 'Client %s is not allowlisted' % audience) |
| 223 | |
| 224 | # We must confirm the client/email is allowlisted before we |
| 225 | # potentially auto-create the user account in Monorail. |
| 226 | return audience, authdata.AuthData.FromEmail( |
| 227 | cnxn, email, self.services, autocreate=True) |
| 228 | |
| 229 | def GetAndAssertRequesterAuth(self, cnxn, metadata, services): |
| 230 | # type: (MonorailConnection, Mapping[str, str], Services -> |
| 231 | # Tuple[str, authdata.AuthData] |
| 232 | """Gets the requester identity and checks if the user has permission |
| 233 | to make the request. |
| 234 | Any users successfully authenticated with oauth must be allowlisted or |
| 235 | have accounts with the domains in api_allowed_email_domains. |
| 236 | Users identified using cookie-based auth must have valid XSRF tokens. |
| 237 | Test accounts ending with @example.com are only allowed in the |
| 238 | local_mode. |
| 239 | |
| 240 | Args: |
| 241 | cnxn: connection to the SQL database. |
| 242 | metadata: metadata sent by the client. |
| 243 | services: connections to backend services. |
| 244 | |
| 245 | Returns: |
| 246 | The client ID and a new AuthData object representing a signed in or |
| 247 | anonymous user. |
| 248 | |
| 249 | Raises: |
| 250 | exceptions.NoSuchUserException: If the requester does not exist |
| 251 | permissions.BannedUserException: If the user has been banned from the site |
| 252 | permissions.PermissionException: If the user is not authorized with the |
| 253 | Monorail scope, is not allowlisted, and has an invalid token. |
| 254 | """ |
| 255 | # TODO(monorail:6538): Move different authentication methods into separate |
| 256 | # functions. |
| 257 | requester_auth = None |
| 258 | client_id = None |
| 259 | # When running on localhost, allow request to specify test account. |
| 260 | if TEST_ACCOUNT_HEADER in metadata: |
| 261 | if not settings.local_mode: |
| 262 | raise exceptions.InputException( |
| 263 | 'x-test-account only accepted in local_mode') |
| 264 | # For local development, we accept any request. |
| 265 | # TODO(jrobbins): make this more realistic by requiring a fake XSRF token. |
| 266 | test_account = metadata[TEST_ACCOUNT_HEADER] |
| 267 | if not test_account.endswith('@example.com'): |
| 268 | raise exceptions.InputException( |
| 269 | 'test_account must end with @example.com') |
| 270 | logging.info('Using test_account: %r' % test_account) |
| 271 | requester_auth = authdata.AuthData.FromEmail(cnxn, test_account, services) |
| 272 | |
| 273 | # Oauth2 ID token auth. |
| 274 | if not requester_auth: |
| 275 | client_id, requester_auth = self.CheckIDToken(cnxn, metadata) |
| 276 | |
| 277 | if client_id is None: |
| 278 | # TODO(crbug.com/monorail/8160): For site users, we temporarily use |
| 279 | # the host as the client_id, until we implement auth in the frontend |
| 280 | # to make API requests with ID tokens that include client_ids. |
| 281 | client_id = 'https://%s.appspot.com' % app_identity.get_application_id() |
| 282 | |
| 283 | |
| 284 | # Cookie-based auth for signed in and anonymous users. |
| 285 | if not requester_auth: |
| 286 | # Check for signed in user |
| 287 | user = users.get_current_user() |
| 288 | if user: |
| 289 | logging.info('Using cookie user: %r', user.email()) |
| 290 | requester_auth = authdata.AuthData.FromEmail( |
| 291 | cnxn, user.email(), services) |
| 292 | else: |
| 293 | # Create AuthData for anonymous user. |
| 294 | requester_auth = authdata.AuthData.FromEmail(cnxn, None, services) |
| 295 | |
| 296 | # Cookie-based auth signed-in and anon users need to have the XSRF |
| 297 | # token validate. |
| 298 | try: |
| 299 | token = metadata.get(XSRF_TOKEN_HEADER) |
| 300 | xsrf.ValidateToken( |
| 301 | token, requester_auth.user_id, xsrf.XHR_SERVLET_PATH, |
| 302 | timeout=self.xsrf_timeout) |
| 303 | except xsrf.TokenIncorrect: |
| 304 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 305 | 'Requester %s does not have permission to make this request.' |
| 306 | % requester_auth.email) |
| 307 | |
| 308 | if permissions.IsBanned(requester_auth.user_pb, requester_auth.user_view): |
| 309 | raise permissions.BannedUserException( |
| 310 | 'The user %s has been banned from using this site' % |
| 311 | requester_auth.email) |
| 312 | |
| 313 | return (client_id, requester_auth) |
| 314 | |
| 315 | def AssertBaseChecks(self, request, metadata): |
| 316 | """Reject requests that we refuse to serve.""" |
| 317 | # TODO(jrobbins): Add read_only check as an exception raised in sql.py. |
| 318 | if (settings.read_only and |
| 319 | not request.__class__.__name__.startswith(('Get', 'List'))): |
| 320 | raise permissions.PermissionException( |
| 321 | 'This request is not allowed in read-only mode') |
| 322 | |
| 323 | if REASON_HEADER in metadata: |
| 324 | logging.info('Request reason: %r', metadata[REASON_HEADER]) |
| 325 | if REQUEST_ID_HEADER in metadata: |
| 326 | # TODO(jrobbins): Ignore requests with duplicate request_ids. |
| 327 | logging.info('request_id: %r', metadata[REQUEST_ID_HEADER]) |
| 328 | |
| 329 | def ProcessException(self, e, prpc_context, mc): |
| 330 | """Return True if we convert an exception to a pRPC status code.""" |
| 331 | logging.exception(e) |
| 332 | logging.info(e.message) |
| 333 | exc_type = type(e) |
| 334 | if exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchUserException: |
| 335 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 336 | prpc_context.set_details('The user does not exist.') |
| 337 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchProjectException: |
| 338 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 339 | prpc_context.set_details('The project does not exist.') |
| 340 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchTemplateException: |
| 341 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 342 | prpc_context.set_details('The template does not exist.') |
| 343 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchIssueException: |
| 344 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 345 | details = 'The issue does not exist.' |
| 346 | if e.message: |
| 347 | details = cgi.escape(e.message, quote=True) |
| 348 | prpc_context.set_details(details) |
| 349 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchIssueApprovalException: |
| 350 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 351 | prpc_context.set_details('The issue approval does not exist.') |
| 352 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchCommentException: |
| 353 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 354 | prpc_context.set_details('No such comment') |
| 355 | elif exc_type == exceptions.NoSuchComponentException: |
| 356 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.NOT_FOUND) |
| 357 | prpc_context.set_details('The component does not exist.') |
| 358 | elif exc_type == permissions.BannedUserException: |
| 359 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED) |
| 360 | prpc_context.set_details('The requesting user has been banned.') |
| 361 | elif exc_type == permissions.PermissionException: |
| 362 | logging.info('perms is %r', mc.perms) |
| 363 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED) |
| 364 | prpc_context.set_details('Permission denied.') |
| 365 | elif exc_type == exceptions.GroupExistsException: |
| 366 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.ALREADY_EXISTS) |
| 367 | prpc_context.set_details('The user group already exists.') |
| 368 | elif exc_type == features_svc.HotlistAlreadyExists: |
| 369 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.ALREADY_EXISTS) |
| 370 | prpc_context.set_details('A hotlist with that name already exists.') |
| 371 | elif exc_type == exceptions.ComponentDefAlreadyExists: |
| 372 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.ALREADY_EXISTS) |
| 373 | prpc_context.set_details('A component with that path already exists.') |
| 374 | elif exc_type == exceptions.ActionNotSupported: |
| 375 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 376 | prpc_context.set_details('Requested action not supported.') |
| 377 | elif exc_type == exceptions.InvalidComponentNameException: |
| 378 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 379 | prpc_context.set_details('That component name is invalid.') |
| 380 | elif exc_type == exceptions.FilterRuleException: |
| 381 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 382 | prpc_context.set_details('Violates filter rule that should error.') |
| 383 | elif exc_type == exceptions.InputException: |
| 384 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 385 | prpc_context.set_details( |
| 386 | 'Invalid arguments: %s' % cgi.escape(e.message, quote=True)) |
| 387 | elif exc_type == exceptions.OverAttachmentQuota: |
| 388 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED) |
| 389 | prpc_context.set_details( |
| 390 | 'The request would exceed the attachment quota limit.') |
| 391 | elif exc_type == ratelimiter.ApiRateLimitExceeded: |
| 392 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.PERMISSION_DENIED) |
| 393 | prpc_context.set_details('The requester has exceeded API quotas limit.') |
| 394 | elif exc_type == oauth.InvalidOAuthTokenError: |
| 395 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.UNAUTHENTICATED) |
| 396 | prpc_context.set_details( |
| 397 | 'The oauth token was not valid or must be refreshed.') |
| 398 | elif exc_type == xsrf.TokenIncorrect: |
| 399 | logging.info('Bad XSRF token: %r', e.message) |
| 400 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 401 | prpc_context.set_details('Bad XSRF token.') |
| 402 | elif exc_type == exceptions.PageTokenException: |
| 403 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INVALID_ARGUMENT) |
| 404 | prpc_context.set_details( |
| 405 | 'Page token invalid or incorrect for the accompanying request') |
| 406 | else: |
| 407 | prpc_context.set_code(codes.StatusCode.INTERNAL) |
| 408 | prpc_context.set_details('Potential programming error.') |
| 409 | return False # Re-raise any exception from programming errors. |
| 410 | return True # It if was one of the cases above, don't reraise. |
| 411 | |
| 412 | def RecordMonitoringStats( |
| 413 | self, start_time, request, response, prpc_context, now=None): |
| 414 | """Record monitoring info about this request.""" |
| 415 | now = now or time.time() |
| 416 | elapsed_ms = int((now - start_time) * 1000) |
| 417 | method_name = request.__class__.__name__ |
| 418 | if method_name.endswith('Request'): |
| 419 | method_name = method_name[:-len('Request')] |
| 420 | |
| 421 | fields = monitoring.GetCommonFields( |
| 422 | # pRPC uses its own statuses, but we report HTTP status codes. |
| 423 | ConvertPRPCStatusToHTTPStatus(prpc_context), |
| 424 | # Use the API name, not the request path, to prevent an explosion in |
| 425 | # possible field values. |
| 426 | 'monorail.v3.' + method_name) |
| 427 | monitoring.AddServerDurations(elapsed_ms, fields) |
| 428 | monitoring.IncrementServerResponseStatusCount(fields) |
| 429 | monitoring.AddServerRequesteBytes( |
| 430 | len(json_format.MessageToJson(request)), fields) |
| 431 | response_length = 0 |
| 432 | if response: |
| 433 | response_length = len(json_format.MessageToJson(response)) |
| 434 | monitoring.AddServerResponseBytes(response_length, fields) |